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RECENT CASES
Mattis v. Schnarr exemplifies judicial activism in a touchy area of public
policy. For those who resent such intrusions into the normal legislative
processes, it is judicial activism at its worst. For those who believe the courts




AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. I
In 1972, Detroit amended its "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance." The original
ordinance contained a finding that certain types of business establishments,
when concentrated in particular areas, had deleterious effect on the
neighborhoods in which the concentration took place.2 Accordingly, the
ordinance provided a system of inverse zoning for "regulated uses" 3 which,
apart from special waiver, could not be located within 1,000 feet of two
other regulated uses or within 500 feet of a residential zone. The 1972
amendments4 included "adult" book stores, and "adult" motion picture
theaters in the regulated use category. If the theater was "used to present"
materials "distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depict-
ing . . . 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,' "5 it
was classified as an "adult" establishment. "Adult" book stores were similar-
ly defined. In addition, the types of "depictions" proscribed by the ordi-
nance were explained in detail.6
Respondents operated two adult motion picture theaters. One began
exhibiting adult films after the effective date of the ordinance and was
located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses. The other was denied
a certificate of occupancy because of the intention to exhibit adult films in a
location also violative of the ordinance.
The theatre owners brought an action against Detroit city officials in
the United States District Court for injunctive relief and a declaratory
1. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
2. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.000 (1962).
3. The businesses regulated were bars, transient hotels and motels,
pawnshops, pool halls, public lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine par-
lors, and taxi dance halls.
4. DETROIT, MICH., AMENDMENTS TO OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, Nos.
742-G, 743-G (Nov. 11, 1972).
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judgment that the amendments to the ordinance were unconstitutional.
The theatre owners contended the ordinance was so vague as to violate the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, that it was an invalid
prior restraint on communication protected by the first amendment, and
that the classification of theaters on the basis of the content of their films
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The district court upheld the validity of the ordinance,7 but the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.8 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The plurality, per
Mr. Justice Stevens, held that respondents were unaffected by the alleged
vagueness of the ordinance. Thus, the Court rejected their claim of inade-
quate notice resulting in a denial of procedural due process. 9 The case was
not considered to be one in which important protected expression of
persons not before the Court would be sufficiently "chilled" by the alleged
vagueness in the ordinance to justify respondents nonetheless raising the
vagueness issue.10 The Court further determined that no impermissible
prior restraint was imposed by the ordinance II and that the ordinance did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 2
Although the case presents several other notable issues, the refusal of
the Court to grant respondents standing to litigate the vagueness and
overbreadth issues, and the two differing approaches used to uphold a
content-discriminatory "place" restriction on heretofore protected 3 speech
are the two issues examined herein.
On several prior occasions, the Court has determined that a defendant
whose own speech was unprotected had standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a statute which purported to prohibit arguably protected
speech. 14 The two prerequisites for litigants wishing to avail themselves of
the standing exception recognized in first amendment overbreadth attacks
are a showing that the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing construc-
tion in the state courts' 5 and that a real and substantial deterrent effect on
7. 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The court upheld the 1,000 foot
provision. It found that it was no greater than essential and imposed only a slight
and incidental burden on first amendment rights.
8. 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975). The reversal was based on the invalidity of
the ordinances under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
9. 427 U.S. at 59.
10. Id. at 61.
11. Id. at 62-63.
12. Id. at 63-73.
13. Because there had been no judicial determination of the movies respond-
ents wished to exhibit declaring them obscene under the standards set forth in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the materials must be presumed within the
protection of the first amendment. See also note 25 infra.
14. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklaho-
ma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. Erzonznik v. Jacksonville, 522 U.S. 205 (1975); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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protected speech is caused by the statute's overbreadth.' 6
As Mr. Justice Blackmun pointed out in his vigorous and well reasoned
dissent, the Detroit ordinance presents substantial overbreadth problems
because of the vagueness of its operation.' 7 Under the ordinance, the
exhibitor has the responsibility of monitoring his theater's classification. To
do this he must master the ambiguous "characterized by an emphasis" and
"used for presenting" language of the ordinance.' 8 Should the exhibitor
determine that his theater is within the "adult" classification, he must then
constantly evaluate the status of all of his neighbors within 1,000 feet who
may also be included in any of the various "regulated use" categories. In
addition, the ordinance is silent as to which "use" (assuming there appear
to be three within a given 1,000 foot radius) is the violator, and which will
be prosecuted.
Thus, although the ordinance refers to expression which must be
presumed constitutionally protected, 19 it is not difficult to envision how the
vagueness of its operation might cause a "chilling effect." Instead of under-
taking the task of monitoring his own films, as well as the operation of all
neighbors who might at some time fall into the "regulated use" category,
the exhibitor might well forego showing any sexually explicit non-obscene
films.
Confronted with an arguably overbroad proscription, the plurality
had then to determine if the ordinance was readily subject to a narrowing
construction. This requirement, characterized as an "effective safeguard
against the loss of protected freedoms of expression" in Dombrowski v.
Pfister,21 involves a judgment on the part of the Court as to whether the
legislation can be rehabilitated in a single adjudication. Although the
dissent uncovered no less than five potentially vague areas, the plurality
cited only one potential area of vagueness. Thus it found the "limited
amount" of uncertainty in the ordinance easily susceptible of a narrowing
construction.2 '
Having decided the ordinance could be so narrowly construed, the
Court had to consider whether it created a real and substantial deterrent
16. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), where the application of
the concept was limited to situations in which the statute was attempting to regulte
actions and conduct as well as speech. However, the requirement was reiterated in
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), in a situation where the distinction
between speech and action was elusive, without mention of the above limitation. See
generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844
(1970), and Note, Overbreadth Review and The Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 532
(1974).
17. 427 U.S. at 88-96 (1976). The Court has long recognized that "the threat
of sanctions may deter. . . almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions
L . . [and that the] government may regulate in the area only with narrow specifici-
ty." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
18. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 32.007 (1972).
19. See note 13 supra.
20. 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965).
21. 427 U.S. at 61.
1977]
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effect on protected expression. The plurality acknowledged that some
expression containing the above "depictions" might indeed be chilled, but
reasoned that "an exhibitor's doubts" as to whether or not a particular film
may be shown in his theater did not involve the "kind of threat to the free
market in ideas and expression" 22 sufficient to warrant a grant of standing.
The tenor of the opinion unmistakably suggests either an alteration of
the deterrent effect requirement or the creation of a new requirement-
that the expression upon which the statute exerts a deterrent or "chilling"
effect must be "important." The view that the "importance" of speech
might have an effect on standing requirements had previously been consid-
ered only in the narrow context of situations involving both speech and
conduct, and then only with respect to the deterrent effect of the statute
being substantial or "important" as to the speech.2 3 Because of its use in
buttressing both the "narrowing" and "deterrent" elements, the plurality
would now apparently impose a third requirement, focusing on the "im-
portance" to society of the content of the expression being deterred, for
litigants seeking to vindicate the rights of absent persons in first amend-
ment overbreadth attacks.
As often occurs in constitutional law cases, those things left unsaid may
be of greater significance than the doctrines dealt with directly. Putting
aside all considerations of whatever overbreadth might be created by the
vagueness of the ordinance's operation, there can be no question as to its
literal facial overbreadth. Included within the ordinance's proscription are
various "anatomical areas" without regard to sexual conduct. 24 Nudity per
se is not sexual conduct and without more can never be proscribed under
the current test for obscenity promulgated in Miller v. California.25
"Anatomical areas," and not "specified sexual activities" comprise a large
part of regulated expression in the ordinance; thus it is clearly overbroad.
The overbreadth problem is de facto vitiated by the holding in part three
of the plurality opinion. However, the implications of the Court's approval
of an ordinance proscribing mere nudity as an area of permissible regulation
are startling in light of the Miller requirement of sexual conduct.26
Closely related to the "importance of the content to society" concept in
the above standing discussion is its use by the plurality in substitution for
what was indicated would be an analysis of the classification's consistency
22. Id.
23. "[O]verbreadth scrutiny has generally been somewhat less rigid in the
context of statutes regulating conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment ....
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614 (1973).
24. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 32.007 (1972).
25. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). "We acknowledge. . . the inherent dangers of under-
taking to regulate any form of expression. .... [W]e now confine the permissible
scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct." (em-
phasis added). Id. at 23-24.
26. The lack of any facial overbreadth consideration is further confused by
Justice Stevens' specific reference to a body of facial overbreadth cases in a discus-
sion ostensibly confined to vagueness. 427 U.S. at 59-60 n. 17.
[Vol. 42
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with the Equal Protection Clause.27 It was precisely the classification's
inconsistency with the Equal Protection Clause, however, that necessitated
the extreme departure of the plurality in the "importance" holding.
Because claims of abridgment of freedom of expression are joined
with claims of denial of equal protection, this part of the case might be
characterized in either first amendment or equal protection terms.
28
The decision to characterize a particular case in first amendment
rather than equal protection terms will depend upon the degree of first
amendment infringement perceived. The greater the burden on first
amendment rights, the more necessary it becomes to abandon the equal
protection test of an incidental infringement in pursuit of a compelling
state interest and to consider the infringement solely in light of the first
amendment.2 9
Without doubt, content regulation is at the core of the first amendment,
thus if first amendment protections are to have any significance
apart from the protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause, the
first amendment tests determining the protection of speech by an analysis
of content, must be definitive restatements of what limited applicable
"compelling state interests" may be found.
That the ordinance imposes a "place" restriction was perhaps the only
point upon which all nine justices agreed. Historically, the Court has
upheld time, place, and manner restrictions on protected expression if they
were necessary to further significant or "compelling" governmental inter-
ests, and were content neutral."0 While requiring equality of treatment
within the class of protected expression, the Court has not expressly pre-
cluded all regulation based upon content. 31 However, the validity of the
distinction drawn via content would be contingent upon a finding that the
expression discriminated against, given its content and the surrounding
circumstances, was unprotected.32
Clearly, the ordinance in Young imposed a place restriction that was
not content neutral. An examination of the traditional first amendment
27. Id. at 63.
28. However, analyzing the case in terms of equal protection allows the Court
more leeway in that it need not define as thoroughly the substantive right involved.
29. Clearly, the elements of the test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968) support this conclusion. In O'Brien, the Court utilized equal
protection analysis only because the statute in question did not abridge free speech
on its face, and the effects on first amendment rights were deemed incidental and
unrelated. Id. at 377. See also text accompanying notes 56-59, infra. See generally N.
CAPALDI, CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER, THE FREE SPEECH CONTROVERSY (1969); T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970).
30. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972).
31. Id. at 98-100.
32. This would certainly preclude content regulation on the face of the
statute. "Predictions about imminent disruption . . . involve judgments appro-
priately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications,
especially those based on subject matter." Id. at 100-01. See also Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring).
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justifications of content regulation yields the conclusion that the only
arguably applicable test determining protection via content would be the
"fear of imminent peril" test.33 However, after the Court's previous rejec-
tion of this rationale as a basis for denying protection to obscene expres-
sion,34 the plurality could not, without fear of an anomalous result, find the
non-obscene "depictions" at issue in Young to fall within the purview of this
test. In addition, it must be shown that the ordinance restricting protected
expression was the least drastic alternative available to the city.35 Because
Detroit's avowed justification revolves around the prevention of crime in
the areas of "regulated use" concentration,36 the traditional deterrent of
punishment for violations of the law appear more directly attuned to the
realization of such a purpose,3 7 without abridging the right of free
expression.
An addition impact of Young is the plurality's treatment of sexually
explicit non-obscene material. The plurality's determination that lower
importance of the content to society warrants lower protection for non-
obscene sexual expression demonstrates further the willingness of the
current Court to retreat from earlier holdings in the area. In Roth v. United
States,38 the Court recognized sex as a great motive force in human life, a
vital problem of human interest, and warned that "[T]he door barring
federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept
tightly closed and only opened the slightest crack necessary. . . ."9 Even-
tually, in Miller v. California,40 the door which was to remain so tightly
closed in Roth seemingly fell off its hinges. In Miller, the Court announced,
"We do not see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas-good or bad...
and 'repression' of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of
33. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
34. The "effects" approach, although mentioned in Paris Adult Theater v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973), (arguable correlation between obscene material and
crime) historically has not been viewed as the reason obscene material is without the
protection of the first amendment. Like libel, the basis for withholding first amend-
ment protection is that it is without social importance. Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The "arguable correlation' cited by Mr. Chief Justice Burger
in Paris Adult Theater, supra, was a three-man minority report of an eighteen-man
commission. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENTIY AND PORNOGRAPHY
243 (1970).
35. "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967).
36. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
37. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1928) (Brandeis and Holmes
JJ., concurring). See also, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962); Schneider v.
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162-163 (1939).
38. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
39. Id. at 487-88.
40. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
[Vol. 42
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commercial exploitation of human interest in sex."'"
Such reasoning has been glaringly put to life in Young, even to the
point of reaching expression entirely protected under the test expressed in
Miller.4 2 Indeed, the statement by Mr. Justice Stevens in Young, that even
in upholding this regulation, the paramount obligation of governmental
neutrality has not been violated because the regulation does not discrimi-
nate according to "whatever social, political, or philosophical message" 43
the film communicates, demonstrates even more vividly the political cast
toward which the protections of freedom of expression may be headed.
Dispensing with whatever minimal differences are involved between "dis-
cussion" and "expression," it is interesting to note that at least four mem-
bers of the Court, in effect, do not view erotic but non-obsene material an
issue "about which information is needed or appropriate to enable mem-
bers of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."44
Baldly asserting that "society's interest in protecting this type of ex-
pression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude. . .. 45 and holding
that the state may legitimately "classify" such materials differently,4 6 the
plurality skirted the traditional tests for determining a content-oriented
ordinance's constitutionality under the first or fourteenth amendment,
while avoiding the anomaly of finding the materials unprotected. By so
categorizing the interests involved, the plurality ultimately relegated the
ordinance's classification to a status justifiable under the mere "rational
relationship" test.
47
By using the "importance of the content of society" notion to reduce
materials dealing explicitly with sex to an area of quasi-protection, the
plurality would take what Mr. Justice Harlan called an "intractable"48
problem and complicate it further. A change from a simpler "protected-
unprotected" theory, which itself has been described as a "strained effort to
trap a problem," 49 to an even more elusive theory can only produce con-
tinued damage to first amendment freedoms.
The approach used by Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion is
significantly different than that employed by the plurality. He professed
disagreement with the importance conclusions used in both the standing
and equal protection holdings of the plurality,50 but found that the ordi-
nance might be otherwise upheld.
41. Id. at 35-36.
42. See text accompanying notes 25, 26 supra.
43. 427 U.S. at 70.
44. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1939).
45. 427 U.S. at 70.
46. Id. at 70-71.
47. Obviously, the requisite relationship was found. The language of the
plurality opinion, however, borders on complete judicial deference. Id. at 71-73.
48. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (separate opin-
ion); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 456 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 11.
50. 427 U.S. at 73 n.1.
1977]
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Mr. Justice Powell viewed the impact of the ordinance as merely
"incidental and minimal"-1 on first amendment interests. This was so
because the tests he used to determine impact considered only the possible
inhibitory effects on creators and audiences, 52 and assumed that the
economics involved in forcing the theater owner either to relocate or to
stop exhibiting erotic films were unimportant or had no direct carry-over
to first amendment inquiry. Crucial to Justice Powell's analysis was the
assumption that first amendment rights with respect to the expression
involved in Young were primarily vested in creator and audience.
So far as protected expression is concerned, first amendment guaran-
tees have always included the exhibitor or middleman;5 3 thus, the absence
of any equal consideration of the ordinance's effect from the standpoint of
the exhibitor draws a very strong parallel to the absence of protection given
the exhibtor in obscenity situations. Where the subject is obscenity, the
Court has emphasized that it will not accept, as a corollary to its position in
Stanley v. Georgia,54 a constitutional right to distribute.5 5 This similarity of
treatment, though the justices appear at first glance to be five to four
against the "importance of the content to society" holdings of the plurality,
is why there can be no clear statement of Young's implications. The align-
ment of the "depictions" at issue here with the treatment given obscene
material must ultimately rest on a conclusion about their "importance."
After finding only "incidental" effects on freedom of expression, Mr.
Justice Powell employed the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien,56 to
determine the permissibility of the ordinance. In O'Brien, defendant was
convicted of knowingly destroying his draft card after he burned it on the
steps of the South Boston Courthouse to illustrate his anti-war beliefs. The
Court found that the statute in question plainly did not abridge free speech
on its face, 57 and noted that when predominately non-speech elements
combine with speech elements in a course of conduct, a compelling state
interest in regulating the former may sometimes justify incidental limita-
tions on the latter.58 In affirming the conviction the Court was careful to
51. Id. at 78.
52. "This prompts essentially two inquiries: (i) does the ordinance impose any
content limitation on the creators of adult movies or their ability to make them
available to whom they desire, and (ii) does it restrict in any significant way the
viewing of these movies by those who desire to see them?" Id.
53. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (the right of
freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or print, but the
right to distribute); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (freedoms such as
these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from
being stifled by more subtle governmental inference); Kingsley Int. Pic. Corp. v.
Regents of N.Y.U., 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (motion pictures are within the first
and fourteenth amendment's basic protection).
54. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (mere private possession of obscene material cannot
constitutionally be made a crime).
55. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1970).
56. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 376.
(Vol. 42
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point out, however, that the governmental interest and operation of the
statute were limited to the non-speech element of the conduct, and was thus
unlike a situation where the government perceived the impact of the
communicative conduct to be harmful.
59
Clearly, the facts in Young present a situation in which the impact of
the communicative conduct is thought to contribute to the harmful results.
Not only is the operation of the ordinance triggered by the content of the
communication, it is also difficult to perceive what "conduct" is involved
absent the communication. Even if one might go so far as to say that the
mere location of a theater is "conduct", the burden would then be on the
government to show that an unoccupied "adult" theater would equally
frustrate the governmental purpose. However, the ordinance itself en-
vinces the governmental belief that it is only because of the communicative
impact, i.e., because of the particular types of films shown, that "undesir-
ables" are attracted into the neighborhood. In a word, the application of
this test has been stretched beyond the breaking point.
The use of the O'Brien test by only one of the justices indicates a
general assumption that the Detroit ordinance directly regulates expres-
sion similar to pure speech. However, as the foregoing indicates, there is a
considerable difference of opinion between the members of the Court
regarding the classification to be given such expression.
Certainly, any zoning ordinance which tracks Detroit's Anti-Skid Row
Ordinance will presently find five votes on the Court. As to an ordinance
which requires concentration rather than inverse zoning, a different situa-
tion is presented. While the plurality indicated that such a scheme would
likely be permissible,60 if the result was an overall curtailment of adult
movie presentations or substantial audience inconvenience, Mr. Justice
Powell's support might be lost.
61
First amendment freedoms are as precious and fundamental as they
are vulnerable. To deny protection to expression the content of which the
Court perceives as only minimally important to society is to drastically
sterilize the first amendment. Surely the essence of censorship is content
control, yet the Court in Young has fashioned a test which grants protection
on the basis of the importance to society of the content of the expression
being regulated.
Sensible enforcement and indeed even the foundation of the first
amendment's free speech guarantee presupposes that protection does not
turn upon the mere "popularity, or social utility62 of the content of the
expression involved. The fact that "few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to . . . see 'specified sexual activities' ,63 is precisely
59. Id. at 381-82. See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
60. 427 U.S. at 71-72.
61. See note 52 supra.
62. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963).
63. 427 U.S. at 70.
1977] 469
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